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1. Introduction 
Powerful CEOs can invest in non-value maximizing projects to pursue managerial objectives in- 
cluding empire-building, expense preference behavior and the like. 1 As such, shareholders monitor 
CEOs in order to prevent such expropriation, but this can be costly if ownership is dispersed ( Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986 ). A partial solution to this problem is provided by dividend payouts. These can act as 
a monitoring device for shareholders because they reduce the amount of cash that CEOs can dissipate 
in non-value maximizing projects ( Jensen, 1986 ) and also increase the frequency of CEO scrutiny from 
outside investors ( Easterbrook, 1984 ). 
The U.S. literature related to non-financial firms documents that CEO entrenchment leads to higher 
dividend payout ratios ( Hu and Kumar, 2004; Elyasani and Zhang, 2013 ). This behavior is ascribed to 
the incentive of entrenched CEOs to discourage minority shareholder monitoring. Where corporate 
governance is weak dividends act as a pre-commitment device: a promise to regularly pay cash to 
shareholders reduces agency costs since it reduces the likelihood that these funds will be wasted on 
projects that increase the private benefits of CEOs without maximizing shareholder value ( John and 
Knyazeva, 2006 ). However, the incentive to pay larger dividends also depends on whether entrenched 
CEOs can fend off take-over threats ( Stulz, 1988 ), and on the degree to which monitoring from the 
board of directors is effective ( Boumosleh and Cline, 2015 ). A possible reason for weak shareholder 
monitoring and low dividend payouts relates to the protection of the rights of minority shareholders. 
In their seminal paper, La Porta et al. (20 0 0) provide evidence that in countries with stronger minority 
rights payout ratios are higher, suggesting that high payout ratios are an outcome, rather than a sub- 
stitute, of strong minority rights. Consistent with this hypothesis, Adjaoud and Ben-Amar (2010) find 
a positive link between the quality of corporate governance and payout ratios. 2 There is evidence also 
that dividends dampen expropriation in group-affiliated firms ( Faccio et al., 2001 ), as investors antici- 
pate the risk of expropriation from the controlling shareholder and require higher payouts. Moreover, 
shareholders in countries with strong creditor rights tend to be more sensitive to possible expropria- 
tion from insiders, suggesting that firm insiders set dividend policies with the objective to minimize 
agency costs of both equity and debt ( Shao et al., 2013 ). This is an important finding – in equilibrium, 
payout ratios should reflect the monitoring incentives of all stakeholders. 
Building upon this literature, we aim to investigate the relationship between CEO power and divi- 
dend payouts in the banking sector. This is of interest because unlike non-bank firms, the objectives 
of managers and shareholders can conflict with those of other powerful stakeholders such as deposi- 
tors and government regulators. Bank executives are subject to the scrutiny of different stakeholders. 
For instance, Schaeck et al. (2012) provide evidence of shareholder discipline for risky institutions, 
while there is no evidence of such discipline from debt holders and regulators. Monitoring by minor- 
ity shareholders may well influence CEO behavior less than oversight from the government. In this 
case, the government may favor lower payouts since this could improve bank capital positions, result- 
ing in safer institutions. Bank safety is a primary concern for the government, because bank failures 
result in long-lasting negative effects on economic growth ( Kupiec and Ramirez, 2013 ). 
Because of government monitoring, the relation between CEO power and dividend payouts in bank- 
ing is not necessarily positive. Banks with entrenched CEOs may have relatively low payout ratios to 
deter greater government scrutiny. Dividend policy can shape the features of agent-principal issues in 
banking and as such is worthy of further investigation. 
1 Alternatively, bank CEOs can decide not to take projects with positive Net Present Value (NPV) ( Vallascas and Hagendorff, 
2013 ). 
2 Other recent literature, however, finds that dividends may act as a substitute for strong minority rights ( De Cesari, 2012 ), 
and can mitigate the conflict between strong and weak stakeholders ( Bøhren et al., 2012 ). This is in-line with the ‘substitute 
model’ for dividends. Dividends are paid by insiders to establish a good reputation and reduce conflicts with minority share- 
holders ( La Porta et al., 20 0 0 ). According to the ‘outcome model’, dividends are the ‘outcome’ of regulation that protects the 
rights of minority shareholders ( La Porta et al., 20 0 0 ). 
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Characteristics of CEO power and dynamics are strongly intertwined with the role of bank cor- 
porate governance. 3 This topic has recently drawn attention from academics and policy makers alike 
( Erkens et al., 2012; Arnaboldi and Casu, 2011 ), because poor corporate governance can increase the 
probability of bank failure, 4 with potentially large negative externalities due to contagion risk, disrup- 
tion of the payment system, and costs deriving from deposit insurance payouts ( BIS, 2010; Mülbert, 
2010 ). 5 
Academic and policy interest in bank dividend policy has increased because of the importance 
of retaining earnings for bank soundness, especially during a recessionary period ( Financial Stability 
Board, 2009; Srivastav et al., 2013; Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013; Hirtle, 2014 ). Recent developments 
in banking regulation also impose restrictions on dividends for undercapitalized banks ( Caruana, 
2010 ). This is necessary because banks can transfer default risk to their creditors and (when bailouts 
take place) to the taxpayer, a phenomenon known as risk-shifting ( Acharya et al., 2011; Kanas, 2013; 
Onali, 2014 ). For this reason, the government has incentives to monitor bank dividend policy. While 
there are studies that investigate bank CEO incentives ( Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011 ), and the link 
between government ownership and bank performance ( Shen and Lin, 2012 ) and risk-taking ( Iannotta 
et al., 2013 ), so far the literature has neglected the impact of government monitoring on bank divi- 
dend policy, and how it interacts with CEO power and incentives. In this paper, we intend to fill this 
important gap in the literature. 
We investigate the association between CEO power, internal monitoring from board of directors, 
government monitoring, and dividend payouts for banks operating in 15 European Union (EU-15) 
member states. We restrict our analysis to EU countries given the more uniform bank regulatory 
framework. Three main proxies for CEO power are investigated: CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and un- 
forced CEO turnover (that is, turnover unrelated to CEO dismissal). Internal monitoring from the board 
of directors is proxied using director ownership, which has been found to be positively related to firm 
performance in the non-financial literature. While CEO power proxies are expected to be negatively 
correlated with performance (the CEO becomes entrenched as she gains more power in the decision- 
making process of the bank), internal monitoring proxies are expected to be positively correlated with 
performance. Our modeling approach also controls for a variety of determinants of dividend payout 
ratios. Unlike the previous literature on bank dividend policy, we can exploit data on government 
monitoring at the bank level in terms of ownership and the presence of government officials repre- 
sented on bank board’s so as to see how the authorities monitor dividend policy. 
Our study presents various innovations. First, we use a new hand-collected dataset on bank own- 
ership structure and corporate governance for 109 listed banks operating in EU-15 countries and com- 
bine this sample with data from Bankscope, Bloomberg, Datastream, Factset, SNL financial, and Lex- 
isNexis. Second, we employ Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation to elicit the impact of CEO power 
on bank payout ratios. In particular, we employ a dummy identifying CEOs that are also among the 
founders of the bank as an instrument for CEO ownership, unforced turnovers, and CEO tenure. Being 
a founder of the bank is positively correlated with CEO ownership and CEO tenure and negatively 
correlated with unforced CEO turnovers, satisfying the relevance restriction. Moreover, since the CEO 
does not have to decide every year to be a founder, this variable is clearly exogenous to dividend 
policy decisions. Finally, following Hirtle (2014) , we also consider the effect of share repurchases. 
Our main finding is that powerful CEOs tend to be detrimental for bank performance and dis- 
tribute lower dividend payouts. In particular, we find a negative relation between CEO ownership and 
payout ratios (performance) and between CEO tenure and payout ratios (performance), and a positive 
3 Corporate governance can be defined as ‘the allocation of authority and responsibilities, i.e. the manner in which the busi- 
ness and affairs of a bank are governed by its board and senior management’ ( BIS, 2010 , p. 5). 
4 Since CEOs tend to be risk-averse ( Smith and Stulz, 1985 ), entrenchment should reduce bank risk-taking. Entrenchment 
can thus reduce the probability of bank default and, in the presence of government-sponsored safety nets (such as deposit 
insurance), may benefit the public as a whole. Recent contributions provide evidence of a nexus between CEO power and bank 
risk-taking ( Pathan, 2009 ), and CEO compensation incentives and bank risk-taking ( Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011 ). Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz (2011) find that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned to those of shareholders did not perform bet- 
ter during the crisis. Their findings are at odds with the view that a lack of alignment between CEO and shareholder incentives 
was a root cause of the financial crisis. 
5 For these reasons, bank directors should comply with higher and broader standards of care ( Macey and O’Hara, 2003 ). 
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relation between unforced CEO turnover and payout ratios (performance). Stronger internal monitor- 
ing from the board of directors, as proxied by the average shareholding of board members, improves 
performance and decreases payout ratios. These findings suggest that entrenched bank CEOs tend to 
distribute lower payout ratios, and stronger internal monitoring from board members decreases pay- 
out ratios, in contrast with what has been found in the non-financial literature. Moreover, when the 
government is a large owner or there is a government official on the bank board, payout ratios are 
lower, while performance does not change. These results suggest that monitoring from the govern- 
ment is detrimental to minority shareholders because the government is incentivized to put bank 
safety and the interests of creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. The remainder of the 
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 
3 describes the methodology and the data sample. Section 4 reports the results and robustness checks 
and Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
This section briefly reviews the literature on dividend policy of nonfinancial firms and banks. 
2.1. Dividend policy and CEO entrenchment 
Dividend policy is one of the cornerstones of financial economics and an extensive literature has 
evolved since Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) seminal work on the irrelevance of dividend policy. In 
the presence of taxes, a zero-dividend policy would be optimal ( Farrar and Selwyn, 1967; Brennan, 
1970 ). Yet, firms do pay dividends. 
Subsequent studies have sought to test Miller and Modigliani’s proposition to see if the results 
derived from theory hold in real financial markets (where the assumptions of perfect information, no 
tax and agency costs, typically do not hold) ( Lease et al., 20 0 0 ). Empirical literature spans an array of 
areas covering dividend policy and how it relates to: tax clienteles ( Elton and Gruber, 1970 ), agency 
costs ( Easterbrook, 1984 ), signalling effects ( Aharony and Swary, 1980 ), life-cycle factors ( DeAngelo et 
al., 20 06, 20 08 ), catering incentives ( Baker and Wurgler, 2004 ), and behavioral factors ( Turner et al., 
2013 ). 
One branch of the literature focusses on the relation between managerial entrenchment and div- 
idend policy. The entrenchment hypothesis argues that managers who fear disciplinary actions tend 
to pay higher dividends as a protection against such actions ( Zwiebel, 1996; Fluck, 1999; Allen et al., 
20 0 0 ). This hypothesis is grounded in the principle that dividends are paid to decrease agency costs 
between managers and shareholders ( Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986 ). By paying dividends, man- 
agers increase the utility of outside shareholders and decrease monitoring incentives. Literature on 
non-financial firms typically support the entrenchment hypothesis ( Hu and Kumar, 2004; Elyasani and 
Zhang, 2013 ). However, the incentive to pay dividends as a monitoring device is negligible for CEOs 
that can fend off take-over threats ( Stulz, 1988 ). In general, entrenched CEOs are less incentivized to 
pay large amounts of dividends in the absence of monitoring from minority shareholders ( Hu and Ku- 
mar, 2004; Elyasani and Zhang, 2013 ), and when shareholder rights are weak ( La Porta et al., 20 0 0; 
Alzahrani and Lasfer, 2012 ). On the other hand, in the presence of laws that insulate managers from 
takeovers, dividend payout ratios fall ( Francis et al., 2011 ). 
2.2. Dividend policy in banking: The role of government monitoring 
In banking dividend policy is an under-researched area. Early studies focus on the signalling power 
of bank dividends ( Keen, 1983; Bessler and Nohel, 1996, 20 0 0 ). More recently, bank dividend policy 
has been investigated because of possible risk-shifting behavior ( Acharya et al., 2011; Srivastav et al., 
2013; Kanas, 2013; Onali, 2014; Hirtle, 2014 ). Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013) confirm the importance 
of size, profitability, growth opportunities, and agency costs in determining bank dividend policy both 
before and during the financial crisis. 
In banking, monitoring can come from the government as well as outside shareholders. The 
government has incentives to monitor bank dividend policy so as to minimize the likelihood that 
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excessive dividend payouts lead to inadequate equity capital buffers. For this reason, restrictions 
on dividend payments and share repurchases for under-capitalized banks are part of the Basel III 
framework. All other things being equal, a low dividend payout ratio can reduce the strength of 
government monitoring on the CEO, because of the positive impact on bank stability. A low dividend 
payout ratio could reduce potential losses for the deposit insurance provider, and in the case of a 
capital shortfall the government is incentivized to exert monitoring pressure on the bank (see, among 
others, Pennacchi, 1987 ). In the words of Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013, p. 57) : ‘[…] the pressure 
associated with holding capital levels near or below the minimum requirement will lead banks to 
plowback earnings to recapitalize themselves.’ 
Because of these reasons, there is a clear conflict of interest between the government and outside 
shareholders as the government has a preference for low dividend payouts while outside shareholders 
prefer high payouts. 
All other things being equal, the sign of the relationship between CEO power and dividend payout 
ratios depends on whether entrenched CEOs wish to discourage monitoring from the government (en- 
trenched CEOs prefer low dividend payout ratios) or from the outside shareholders (entrenched CEOs 
prefer high dividend payout ratios). To the knowledge of the authors, there is currently no theoretical 
contribution that can help us predict the sign of this relationship. We expect that in Europe, a com- 
bination of weak protection of minority shareholders ( Faccio et al., 2001 ) and government monitoring 
may allow entrenched bank CEOs to pay lower dividend payout ratios than CEOs with less power. 
To examine these relationships we employ three proxies for CEO power: CEO Ownership , Unforced 
CEO Turnover , and CEO Tenure . As CEO Ownership and CEO Tenure increase, the CEO becomes more 
powerful, in the sense that they acquire a stronger position in the decision-making process of the 
bank. 6 CEO Ownership has two types of effects: an entrenchment effect, because of the voting power 
associated with the ownership of bank shares, and an incentive effect deriving from the right to re- 
ceive dividends ( Stulz, 1988; Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002 ). The positive correlation between CEO Owner- 
ship and CEO power is substantiated by recent research showing that an increase in CEO Ownership 
decreases the likelihood of a CEO dismissal ( Bhagat et al., 2010 ). 
CEO Tenure is the natural logarithm of the number of years for which the CEO has been in office. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) argue that some determinants of CEO power take time to develop, 
and for this reason CEO power tends to increase with tenure. 7 Since the relationship between tenure 
and dividend payout ratios may be nonlinear ( Hu and Kumar, 2004 ), we consider the natural loga- 
rithm of tenure (in years). While CEO Ownership and CEO Tenure increase CEO power, CEO turnover 
events should reduce it. This is because the new CEO may need time to entrench and pursue policies 
that do not maximize shareholder value ( Jiraporn et al., 2012 ). However, CEO Turnover may depend 
on dividends, since dividend cuts may lead to CEO dismissal ( Schaeck et al., 2012 ). For this reason 
we consider only unforced CEO turnover as a proxy for CEO power, creating a dummy variable equal 
to one if turnover that cannot be defined as forced takes place, and zero otherwise ( CEO Unforced 
Turnover ). In a nutshell, unforced turnovers refer to turnovers that are not a result of dismissal, for 
instance, cases in which the CEO has retired. 8 
Our CEO power proxies are likely to be related to “bad” corporate governance. Apart from CEO 
Ownership , for which the incentive effect could dominate the entrenchment effect, the stronger the 
CEO, the stronger the degree of agency costs between the CEO and shareholders. We expect dividend 
payouts to be negatively linked CEO Ownership and CEO Tenure and positively related to CEO Unforced 
Turnover . This is in contrast with the received wisdom in the non-financial literature, which posits 
6 Since CEO Ownership is positively skewed, we repeat our main estimations using the natural logarithm of CEO Ownership . 
The results are virtually the same. 
7 CEO Tenure may also increase moral hazard, since for CEOs close to retirement reputational damage resulting from dismissal 
is less important ( Murphy, 1986; Hu and Kumar, 2004 ). 
8 In Appendix A1 we provide more detailed explanations of how we distinguish between forced and unforced CEO turnover. 
This proxy is related to CEO Tenure , because turnover results in a drop in tenure. However, while tenure can be related to recent 
dismissals (which may be related to dividend cuts), for Unforced CEO Turnover such reverse causality we believe is unlikely to 
occur. 
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that firms with entrenched CEOs should have larger dividend payout ratios to discourage monitoring 
from outside shareholders. 
What happens if we consider the impact of stock ownership of board members? This variable 
should be a proxy for “good” governance because, as suggested by Bhagat et al. (2008) , director own- 
ership improves monitoring on the CEO and other executives. Empirical studies show that director 
ownership consistently correlates with good performance ( Bhagat and Bolton, 2008, 2013 ). For this 
reason, we also investigate the impact of this variable on payout ratios and performance. Theoret- 
ically, larger director ownership should lead to less entrenchment, and therefore should lead to a 
decrease in agency costs and dividend payouts. Following Bhagat and Bolton (2013) , we employ the 
proxy Director Ownership €, which consists of the average value of the stake of board members (in 
millions of Euros). 9 
Pressure from the government could lead to lower dividend payout ratios, as a result of potential 
political and reputational damage associated with bank failure ( Brown and Dinç, 2005 ). In the follow- 
ing section we outline the impact of government monitoring on dividend payout ratios in the form of 
both government ownership and the representation of government officials on bank boards. 
2.3. The impact of government monitoring 
The recent financial crisis has prompted a reconsideration of the role of government monitoring in 
the banking system, with the objective of aligning private incentives with public interest. Of particu- 
lar interest is the case of government ownership. While government ownership of banks can provide 
the authorities with an additional tool for crisis management, it may also give rise to agency prob- 
lems – for instance, politically motivated lending can lead to inefficiencies and cronyism ( ˇCihák and 
Demirgüç-Kunt, 2013 ). Iannotta et al. (2007) provide evidence of a negative effect of government mon- 
itoring, in the form of government ownership, on bank performance. In our analysis, we are interested 
in the role of government ownership on agency costs and private incentives. 
According to Gugler (2003) , when the government acquires ownership of a firm, there is a dou- 
ble principal-agent problem: between the government and citizens (the government is the agent), 
and managers (the government is the principal). Government ownership should result in increased 
monitoring and therefore higher dividend payout ratios, however, the government’s objectives can be 
twofold: (1) maximizing shareholder value; and (2) protecting depositors’ rights. The latter objective, 
as mentioned above, is likely to be a consequence of possible reputational and political damage in the 
case of bank liquidation, 10 or it may be associated with concerns of potential losses deriving from de- 
posit insurance schemes or other types of (implicit or explicit) guarantees. Since high dividend payout 
ratios reduce the ability of a bank to pay back its creditors, government monitoring can also lead to 
lower dividend payout ratios. 
We employ two proxies for government monitoring. The first proxy is the percentage stockholding 
of the government, Government Ownership . This proxy is highly positively skewed, and for this reason 
we take this variable in natural logs. The second proxy considers both government ownership and the 
presence of a government official on the board of directors of the bank. We construct the dummy 
variable Government monitoring which takes the value one if either the government owns at least 3% 
of the bank shares 11 or there is a government official on the board of directors of the bank, and zero 
otherwise. These variables are assumed to be positively correlated with the extent of government 
monitoring. 
9 This proxy is, according to Bhagat and Bolton (2013, p. 105) “simple, intuitive, less prone to measurement error, and not 
subject to the problem of weighting a multitude of governance provisions in constructing a governance index.” Because data on 
director ownership tends to be available at the bank-level but not at the director-level, we cannot calculate the median director 
ownership for each bank. 
10 Iannotta et al. (2013) find that government-owned banks face strong political pressure and may pursue objectives different 
from profit maximization. During election years, government-owned banks display higher lending growth and lower profitabil- 
ity than private banks. Higher lending growth is consistent with the government objective to favor political supporters. 
11 This is the sample mean for Government Ownership (see Table 3 ), rounded up to the nearest integer. Using alternative 
thresholds, such as 2%, 4%, or 6% does not change substantially our main results. 
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3. Methodology and data 
This section describes the methodology and data set. Section 3.1 describes the econometric frame- 
work. Section 3.2 describes our instrumental variables. Section 3.3 outlines the data set. 
3.1. Methodology 
The empirical literature on CEO entrenchment for non-financial firms is heterogeneous in terms 
of econometric methodology and variables chosen. 12 Since the government is likely to be concerned 
about safety, and common equity is a key component of the regulatory capital in banking, we employ 
the dividend to equity ratio as the dependent variable, following previous literature on bank dividend 
policy ( Acharya et al., 2012; Kanas, 2013; Onali, 2014 ). Using equity in the denominator rather than 
earnings has an additional advantage: it eliminates the problem of dealing with negative dividend 
payout ratios. However, since the ratio of dividends to equity is highly skewed to the right, in our 
main regressions we use this variable in logs, DPE (Ln). 
In the spirit of Bhagat and Bolton (2008, 2013) , we rely on a simultaneous equation framework to 
tease out the relation between dividend policy, CEO power and performance. In our first set of tests 
we focus on the relation between CEO power, performance, and dividend policy: 
Div it = f ( P er f it , CEO it , C it ) (1) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N labels panel units (banks), t = 1, 2, …, T i labels time periods (years), Div is the 
proxy for the payout ratio, Perf is the proxy for performance, CEO the proxy for CEO power, and C is a 
vector of control variables. As proxies for performance, we choose the Market-to-book ratio, and Tobin 
Q . We choose these proxies because they are related to the existence of growth opportunities and are 
therefore linked to the concept of CEO entrenchment: banks with high Market-to-book ratios and high 
Tobin Q are likely to have projects with positive NPV. Thus, a negative relation between performance 
and payout ratios suggests that banks decrease payout ratios to invest in projects with positive NPV. 13 
If the relation is positive, on the other hand, banks tend to decrease payout ratios despite the absence 
of projects with positive NPV, suggesting expropriation of minority shareholders. Moreover, these ra- 
tios are less likely to be manipulated by banks than accounting measures of performance such as ROA 
or ROE. 14 
To better identify whether the CEO is effectively entrenched or not, we must also investigate the 
determinants of performance variables. If the proxies for CEO power that we employ increase perfor- 
mance, then the CEO is unlikely to be entrenched. On the other hand, if there is a negative or insignif- 
icant relation between the CEO proxies and performance, then the CEO is likely to be entrenched. For 
example, in the case of CEO Ownership and performance proxies, a positive relation would suggest 
absence of entrenchment. 
As described above, we also consider the effect of director ownership, using the proxy Director 
Ownership €. 
To examine the impact of government monitoring on bank dividend policy, we employ the follow- 
ing specification: 
Div it = f ( P er f it , Gov it , C it ) (2) 
In our main regressions, we include both bank and year fixed effects to account for unobservable, 
time-invariant bank-specific characteristics, and time-varying shocks on the European banking indus- 
try, assumed to have the same impact on dividend policy in all observed banks. For these tests, we 
rely on 2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regressions. However, we also employ 3SLS models in robustness 
tests. 
12 For instance, Francis et al. (2011) employ dividends scaled by earnings, dividends scaled by total assets (book value), and 
dividends scaled by total assets (market value). 
13 Blau and Fuller (2008) develop a model that emphasizes the trade-off between dividends and financial flexibility. Managers 
that believe the firm has good future growth opportunities may desire a higher level of financial flexibility. 
14 As explained in Section 4.3 , we also run robustness tests with ROA and loans growth instead of Market-to-book and Tobin 
Q . 
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We include in our regressions several controls in Eqs. (1) and (2) . Size, profitability and growth 
opportunities are believed to be the main drivers of dividend policy for non-financial firms ( Fama 
and French, 2001 ). As stated above, we proxy for profitability and growth opportunities using the 
performance variables Market-to-book and Tobin Q . We proxy for Bank Size using the natural loga- 
rithm of total bank assets. The non-bank literature documents that large firms tend to pay higher 
dividends ( Fama and French, 2001; Francis et al., 2011 ). Thus, we expect the coefficient on Bank Size 
to be positive. The stage of the bank life-cycle, represented by earned equity ( DeAngelo et al., 2006; 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007 ), is proxied by the Retained earnings ratio (retained earnings divided 
by total equity). Banks with large values of earned equity are likely to be at a more mature stage of 
their life-cycle, and thus should have more cash available for distribution to shareholders. In robust- 
ness tests, we also consider specifically the impact of the tax differential between capital gains and 
dividends, and we employ the total payout ratio (cash dividends plush share repurchases dividend by 
equity). To allow for the effects of the Eurozone sovereign debt problems and the Capital Require- 
ment and Bonuses Package (CRBP), which came into force on January 1, 2011, we include the dummy 
Year > 2010 , which is equal to one for the years 2011, 2012, 2013 and zero otherwise. 15 
For the regressions on bank performance, we include the following set of controls: Board Size , 
RetVol (standard deviation of monthly bank stock returns), Size (log of total assets), and Year > 2010 , 
in addition to Treasury securities (the ratio of treasury securities to loans, which is an excluded in- 
strument for the regressions on the payout ratio). These control variables are also justified by the 
non-financial literature, in particular Bhagat and Bolton (2013) . 16 
3.2. Instrumental variables 
Because dividend policy, performance, and corporate governance/ownership structure variables are 
endogenous, we must rely on an Instrumental Variables (IV) setup for our econometric strategy. 
The CEO power proxies ( CEO Ownership , Unforced CEO Turnover , and CEO Tenure ) are instrumented 
by the dummy Founder CEO , which takes on the value one when the CEO of the bank is also one of the 
founders. This variable is likely to be positively correlated with the degree of clout of the CEO within 
the bank, and we expect Founder CEO to be positively correlated with CEO Ownership and CEO Tenure , 
and negatively correlated with Unforced Turnover. The CEO cannot decide every year to be a founder, 
suggesting that Founder CEO is exogenous to dividend policy. For the performance proxies, we employ 
the instrument Treasury securities , equal to the ratio of securities issued by governments to loans and 
we expect a positive relationship between this ratio and performance because banks are likely to buy 
these securities when government bond yields are high and bank stock prices are also high (resulting 
in high Market-to-book and Tobin Q ). Conversely, in periods of high risk-aversion, “flight to quality”
occurs, and investors move from stocks to government bonds, leading to lower Treasury bond yields 
and Market-to-book and Tobin Q . Given that the level of Treasury securities depends mainly on current 
conditions in the bond and stock markets, this variable is likely to be exogenous to dividend policy. 17 
A positive correlation between performance and investing in government securities rather than loans 
for sample periods including the 20 07–20 09 financial crisis (as in our case) is consistent with Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012) . 
For the proxy of director ownership, we choose the value of the stake of the CEO as an instrumen- 
tal variable, CEO Ownership € (in millions of Euros). We expect CEO Ownership € to be positively cor- 
related with Director Ownership €, simply because of cross-sectional differences in the average emolu- 
ments paid to board members and executives at the bank-level. Therefore, this variable is likely to be 
exogenous to dividends and performance. 
15 The CRBP imposes restrictions on executive compensation and is believed to reduce incentives to create value ( Murphy, 
2013 ). 
16 Bhagat and Bolton (2013) also include industry performance and the ratio of research and development plus advertising 
expenses to assets. However, we are only looking at the banking industry, for which research and development expenses are 
negligible, and advertising expenses are not reported. 
17 Bhagat and Bolton (2008, 2013) use treasury stock as an instrument for performance. However, this variable is not available 
for European banks. This proxy is also likely to be endogenous in the regressions using the total payout ratios as dependent 
variable. 
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We instrument both Government Ownership and Government monitoring using a measure of own- 
ership concentration, namely the Herfindahl–Hirshman Index (HHI). 18 The reason for our choice is 
twofold: first, when the government intervenes in the bank, it usually acquires large stakes in the 
bank, thereby artificially increasing the level of ownership concentration – this fact generates a pos- 
itive correlation between the HHI and the two proxies for government monitoring; second, because 
the increase in HHI is a natural consequence of government monitoring, unrelated to bank dividend 
policy. Both the exclusion and relevance restrictions are thus satisfied. 
3.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
We build a new hand-collected data set with information on board composition and ownership 
structure for 109 listed banks (commercial banks, bank holding companies, and cooperative banks) 19 
located in 15 EU countries for the period 2005–2013. 20 The sample period starts in 2005 to reduce 
the impact of different accounting standards on cross-country comparability, since in this year Inter- 
national Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became compulsory for all EU listed companies. 
We start with the universe of European publicly quoted banks listed on Bankscope (EU-15). For 
the sake of comparability, we focus on banks which use IFRS accounting standards. We focus on insti- 
tutions classified as: commercial banks, bank holding companies, holding companies and cooperative 
banks. A total number of 127 banks satisfy these selection criteria. Next, we exclude institutions for 
which data on gross loans is unavailable (6, resulting in 121 remaining banks). 21 Finally, to allow 
hand-collection of information on corporate governance and ownership structure, we stipulate that 
there is at least one annual report (available on the bank’s web site) for the period 2005–2013. These 
criteria results in a sample of 109 banks. The geographic distribution of our sample is similar to that 
in the related literature. 22 
Table 1 presents the main steps of our sample construction. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the 
number of banks per country and type of bank, and the sample representativeness relative to the 
population of listed banks in the EU-15 over the sample period. Our final sample is an unbalanced 
panel with 913 bank-year observations for 109 banks. However, data availability for the main variables 
reduces the amount of bank-year observations to 775, as shown in Table 3 . 
In our analysis, we concentrate on payout ratios as well as the decision to pay a dividend. We 
calculate the dividend payout ratio ( DPE ) as dividends paid for a given year divided by bank equity. 
Because this variable is positively skewed, our main regressions are based on the natural logarithm of 
DPE . Table 3 reports statistics for the decision to pay a dividend (the dummy variable Dividends payer ), 
DPE (Ln) and proxies for CEO power and performance. We report the statistics for the whole sample 
(Panel A) and for the regressions on DPE (Ln), considering only the cases for which cash dividends are 
paid by the bank (Panel B). 
Government shareholding is on average 2.7% for the whole sample (and 1.41% when we exclude 
cases for which there are no dividends paid), considering cases even when the government does not 
hold any bank shares. However, when we consider only cases where the government has an owner- 
ship stake the average value increases to 19.81% (10%). Therefore, as said above, once the government 
18 The HHI is measured as follows: 
H H I = N ∑ 
i =1 s 2 i 
where s i is the ownership share for shareholder i . Given that this variable is highly positively skewed, we consider the natural 
logarithm of the HHI in our regressions. 
19 All cooperative banks in our sample are publicly traded and, therefore, are partly owned by non-members. 
20 We collect information from different sources: bank annual reports (including notes to financial statements), corporate 
governance reports, and other documents available from the web sites of the banks, banking regulators and authorities, and 
other publicly available sources. 
21 Our purpose is to exclude firms that are not in the lending business, as in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) . 
22 The geographic distribution of our sample differs slightly from that of Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) , who investigate 
41 banks from Europe for the period 20 0 0–20 08, due to different selection criteria. In particular, Vallascas and Hagendorff
(2013) stipulate that data on CEO compensation be available for at least five years. 
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Table 1 
Steps of sample construction. 
Search criterion Number of banks 
Step 1 Listed banks 2454 
Step 2 World region: European Union (15) 255 
Step 3 Accounting standards: IFRS 187 
Step 4 Specialization: Commercial banks, Cooperative banks, Bank holdings & Holding companies 127 
Step 5 Information availability: gross loans 121 
Step 6 Information availability (annual reports on the banks’ web sites and market capitalization) 109 
Table 2 
Sample composition and representativeness. 
Country Banks Sample % Observations Sample % 
Austria 7 6 54 7 
Belgium 3 3 16 2 
Denmark 11 10 85 11 
Finland 4 4 24 3 
France 8 7 72 9 
Germany 9 8 68 9 
Greece 11 10 39 5 
Ireland 2 2 16 2 
Italy 22 20 153 20 
Luxembourg 2 2 14 2 
Netherlands 5 5 39 5 
Portugal 4 4 24 3 
Spain 8 7 59 8 
Sweden 4 4 36 5 
United Kingdom 9 8 76 10 
Total: 109 100 775 100 
BHC Commercial Cooperative Total 
Total bankscope sample in 2013 (listed banks, EU-15) 
1 Banks 38 78 24 140 
2 Sample % 27.14 55.71 17.14 10 0.0 0 
Sample banks 
3 Banks 30 68 11 109 
4 Sample % 27.52 62.39 10.10 10 0.0 0 
5 Representativeness, % (3/1) 78.95 87.18 45.83 77.86 
Total Bankscope sample in 2013 (listed banks, EU-15) 
1 Assets Millions of Euros 9,133,293 12,463,542 2,336,025 23,932,860 
2 Share of total assets, % 38.16 52.08 9.76 10 0.0 0 
Sample banks 
3 Assets millions of Euros 9,112,651 12,026,512 2,053,685 23,192,848 
4 Share of total assets, % 39.29 51.85 8.85 10 0.0 0 
5 Representativeness, % (3/1) 99.77 96.49 87.91 96.91 
buys bank stocks, the ownership structure becomes immediately more concentrated and the HHI in- 
creases. The cases for which we have a government official on the board of directors are 7.7% of the 
total sample (5% when considering only dividend payers). 23 
23 The voting rights of the government share are exercised by different types of individuals/groups, depending on the country 
examined. For instance, in Austria it is the Federal Minister of Finance, in Belgium the Council of Ministers. In France and the 
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Fig. 1 shows the geographical distribution of the average DPE across countries over the sample 
period. The effect of the financial crisis of 20 08–20 09 and the subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt 
problems elicit heterogeneous responses from banks in different European countries. All countries 
except for Belgium and Sweden experienced a reduction in mean DPE from 2008 onwards (Panel 
A). When we compare 20 05–20 07 with 20 08–20 09, the mean DPE increases even for Danish banks. 
Sharp declines in DPE occurred for the countries that were most affected by the crisis. For Portugal, 
the mean DPE dropped from 5.22% in 20 05–20 07 to 2.44% in 20 08–20 09. For Italy it fell from 4.70% 
to 2.91%. However, Irish banks were the most affected: the mean DPE was 6.82% just before the crisis 
in 2007 and 0% from 2010 until the end of the sample period. In Fig. 2 , we compare the trend of DPE 
over the sample period for Ireland, where there is a sharp drop after the crisis, and Sweden, where 
DPE is overall stable. 
4. Results 
In this section, we report the results of our main regressions. We employ the econometric proce- 
dure described in Section 3.1 . Section 4.1 reports the main results with respect to the effect of CEO 
power on payout ratios and performance, and the effect of director ownership (a proxy for internal 
monitoring on bank CEOs) on payout ratios and performance. Section 4.2 reports the main results for 
the impact of government monitoring on payout ratios and performance. Section 4.3 reports robust- 
ness checks. 
4.1. CEO power, dividends and bank performance 
4.1.1. Results for CEO Ownership, Unforced CEO Turnover and CEO Tenure 
Table 4 reports our main results for the 2SLS regressions on the relation between CEO power (prox- 
ied by CEO Ownership , CEO Tenure , and Unforced CEO Turnover ) and the payout ratio, DPE (Ln), allow- 
ing for the effect of bank performance as proxied by Market-to-Book and Tobin Q . The Kleibergen-Paap 
tests for weak IV and the coefficients on the IVs for the first stage of the regressions support the 
hypothesis that our instruments, Founder CEO and Treasury securities , are strongly correlated with the 
CEO power and bank performance proxies, respectively. The results for the coefficients on the prox- 
ies for CEO power suggest a negative relation between CEO power and payout ratios. The results for 
the coefficients on the bank performance proxies show a positive relation between performance and 
payout ratios. 
To what extent are the results reported in Table 4 a result of sample selection bias? Table 5 re- 
ports the results for Heckman selection models investigating the impact of CEO power, proxied by 
CEO Ownership , and performance on the payout ratio ( DPE (Ln)), allowing for possible sample selec- 
tion bias. Moreover, to increase the robustness of our results, we also run 3SLS models on the relation 
between CEO power, dividends, and bank performance. In these regressions, we also add a key vari- 
able to our framework: volatility of returns (standard deviation of monthly stock returns, RetVol ). This 
variable is found to negatively affect performance ( Bhagat and Bolton, 2013 ). We posit that this vari- 
able has an indirect effect on the payout ratio: firms with higher information costs are likely to have 
more volatile earnings, and therefore they will favor lower payouts to reduce the likelihood that earn- 
ings do not fall below some threshold needed to remit dividends. For this reason, RetVol enters the 
selection equation in the Heckman models, and the equation on Market-to-Book and Tobin Q in the 
3SLS models. 
The results in Table 5 show that CEO Ownership is still negatively correlated with DPE (Ln). More- 
over, as expected, higher RetVol results in lower performance and a lower propensity to pay dividends. 
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test on the.s significance of the correlation between the residuals of the 
outcome and selection equation for the Heckman selection model confirm that some degree of sam- 
ple selection bias exists. The 3SLS models also confirm the positive relation between performance and 
UK, the shares are handled by agencies specifically appointed for this purpose (Agence des participations de l’État (APE) in 
France and the UK Financial Investments (UKFI) in the UK). 
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(A) Average DPE (%) across countries for 2005-2007 and 2008-2013.
(B) Average DPE (%) across countries for 2005-2007 and 2008-2009.
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Fig. 1. Average DPE (%) across countries over the sample period. 
payout ratios, and indicate that CEOs increase their ownership as performance increases (performance 
increases CEO Ownership ), but the opposite is not true ( CEO Ownership does not increase Market-to- 
Book or Tobin Q ). The latter results suggest that CEO Ownership is a good proxy for “bad” corporate 
governance or, in other words, CEOs with large stockholdings are “entrenched”. However, the negative 
coefficient on CEO Ownership for the regressions on the payout ratio, DPE (Ln), is inconsistent with 
the findings of the non-financial literature on CEO power and the payout ratio, which documents that 
CEO entrenchment leads to higher dividend payout ratios ( Hu and Kumar, 2004 ). 24 
24 The results for Unforced CEO Turnover and CEO Tenure , untabulated but available upon request, are qualitatively the same: 
while these proxies do not improve performance, they suggest that more powerful CEOs tend to decrease payout ratios. 
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4.1.2. Results for Director Ownership €
Does stronger internal monitoring from the board of directors improve bank performance? In Table 
6 we examine the impact of Director Ownership € on bank payout ratios using Heckman selection 
models and 3SLS models that allow for the interactions between director ownership, dividend payout 
ratios, and performance. As said above, this variable has been found to be positively correlated with 
performance in previous empirical studies ( Bhagat and Bolton, 2008, 2013 ). The results reported in 
Table 6 confirm that this is the case: Director Ownership € is positively related to both Market-to- 
Book and the Tobin Q ratio. However, our results also provide some evidence of a negative impact on 
dividend payout ratios, although the coefficients on Director Ownership € are significant for the 3SLS 
regressions but not for the Heckman selection model 
4.1.3. “Good” corporate governance and current and future performance 
To further dig deeper into the relationship between performance and “good/bad” corporate gover- 
nance, Table 7 reports the results of 2SLS regressions of current and future performance on Director 
Ownership €, using as IV CEO Ownership €. The results confirm that Director Ownership € increases 
both current and future performance. Among the control variables, RetVol and Size decrease current 
performance, while the variable Treasury securities increases performance. The dummy Year > 2010 is 
related to a drop in performance, most likely because of the consequences of the financial crisis and 
the ensuing Eurozone sovereign debt problems. Besides Year > 2010 , Director Ownership € is the only 
variable that affects both Market-to-Book and Tobin Q even in the following years ( t + 1 and t + 2). 
Tables 8 and 9 report the same results but for CEO Ownership , Unforced CEO Turnover and CEO 
Tenure . The results suggest that CEO Ownership decreases current performance and the performance 
of the next year. However, the effect ceases to exist at t + 2. The results for Unforced CEO Turnover 
and CEO Tenure confirm the negative impact of our CEO power proxies on performance. 
To recap, the results for Director Ownership € are consistent with those provided by the entrench- 
ment literature on non-financial firms: director ownership improves performance. The results for CEO 
Ownership suggest that the entrenchment effect dominates the incentive effect, and entrenched CEOs 
do not increase payout ratios to discourage monitoring from bank shareholders. These findings can 
be interpreted as evidence that performance-based incentives based on ownership stakes work well 
when they are applied to board members, but less well when applied to bank CEOs, for which the 
entrenchment effect appears to dominate. Moreover, they suggest that entrenched bank CEOs have 
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Table 7 
Determinants of current and future performance: Director Ownership €. 
Performance proxy Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q 
Period t t + 1 t + 2 t t + 1 t + 2 
Director Ownership € 0.010 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.010 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗
(8.683) (4.676) (2.723) (8.668) (4.673) (2.723) 
Board Size −0.008 −0.011 −0.012 −0.008 −0.011 −0.012 
( −0.728) ( −1.033) ( −0.917) ( −0.727) ( −1.013) ( −0.901) 
RetVol −1.139 ∗∗ 0.465 0.702 −1.093 ∗∗ 0.461 0.691 
( −2.063) (0.979) (1.321) ( −2.014) (0.985) (1.321) 
Treasury securities 0.193 ∗∗∗ −0.021 0.002 0.191 ∗∗∗ −0.022 0.002 
(7.506) ( −0.754) (0.051) (7.549) ( −0.776) (0.073) 
Size −0.323 ∗∗ −0.079 0.029 −0.323 ∗∗ −0.082 0.029 
( −2.140) ( −0.511) (0.101) ( −2.172) ( −0.536) (0.102) 
Year > 2010 −0.749 ∗∗∗ −1.121 ∗∗∗ −0.829 ∗∗∗ −0.736 ∗∗∗ −1.102 ∗∗∗ −0.815 ∗∗∗
( −4.328) ( −6.522) ( −4.657) ( −4.321) ( −6.548) ( −4.648) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
CEO Ownership € 0.078 ∗∗∗ 0.085 ∗∗∗ 0.084 ∗∗∗ 0.078 ∗∗∗ 0.085 ∗∗∗ 0.084 ∗∗∗
(7.210) (5.111) (5.833) (7.208) (5.108) (5.832) 
Crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 285 263 233 284 261 233 
Banks 54 54 48 54 53 48 
Kleibergen-Paap 51.93 26.12 33.92 51.91 26.07 33.92 
R -squared 0.737 0.576 0.207 0.735 0.577 0.205 
Notes: 2SLS regressions for dividend payers. Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics 
in parentheses. Performance variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Significance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Significance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Significance at 1% level. 
little incentive to discourage monitoring from shareholders by increasing payout ratios. In the next 
section, we examine the impact of government monitoring on payout ratios and bank performance. 
4.2. Government monitoring, dividends and bank performance 
Table 10 reports the results for 2SLS and 3SLS regressions investigating the impact of government 
monitoring on payout ratios. For the 2SLS models, the Kleibergen-Paap tests for weak IV and the 
coefficients on the IVs for the first stage of the regressions supports the hypothesis that HHI is a 
strong instrument for both Government Ownership (Ln) and Government monitoring . The results for our 
2SL S and 3SL S regressions suggest that government monitoring decreases payout ratios, contrary to 
what is argued by Gugler (2003) . These results backup the view that governments are keen to reduce 
bank payout ratios for the fear of potential reputational damage and financial losses deriving from 
bank defaults. 
Is government monitoring good for bank performance? We answer this question in Table 11 . The 
results suggest that government monitoring has little impact on bank current and future perfor- 
mance. 25 These results are somewhat consistent with the findings reported by Iannotta et al. (2007) , 
who find that in Europe government-owned banks do not outperform privately-owned banks. 
What happens if the government changes as a result of elections? To answer this question, we col- 
lect data on elections (both parliamentary elections and, if available, presidential elections) from the 
Elections Database (website http://www.nsd.uib.no/european _ election _ database/ ). This website con- 
25 It could be argued that some of these results are a result of a weak IV problem for our performance regressions. However, 
even when we employ similar OLS regressions with bank and year fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered on the 
bank level, the results still suggest lack of correlation between government monitoring and bank performance. 
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Table 8 
Determinants of current and future performance: CEO Ownership . 
Performance proxy Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q 
Period t t + 1 t + 2 t t + 1 t + 2 
CEO ownership −0.141 ∗∗ −0.087 ∗ 0.012 −0.140 ∗∗ −0.086 ∗ 0.015 
( −2.244) ( −1.865) (0.116) ( −2.257) ( −1.858) (0.138) 
board size −0.006 −0.014 −0.015 −0.006 −0.014 −0.015 
( −0.463) ( −1.242) ( −1.026) ( −0.459) ( −1.221) ( −1.010) 
RetVol −1.443 ∗∗∗ −0.070 0.098 −1.396 ∗∗ −0.065 0.094 
( −2.592) ( −0.215) (0.294) ( −2.551) ( −0.201) (0.286) 
Treasury securities 0.256 ∗∗∗ 0.0 0 0 −0.044 0.254 ∗∗∗ 0.0 0 0 −0.044 
(6.939) (0.021) ( −0.801) (6.962) (0.001) ( −0.815) 
Size −0.331 ∗∗ −0.075 0.062 −0.331 ∗∗ −0.078 0.062 
( −1.963) ( −0.602) (0.199) ( −1.994) ( −0.632) (0.202) 
Year > 2010 −0.709 ∗∗∗ −1.132 ∗∗∗ −0.893 ∗∗∗ −0.696 ∗∗∗ −1.112 ∗∗∗ −0.879 ∗∗∗
( −8.055) ( −9.634) ( −5.781) ( −8.133) ( −9.663) ( −5.764) 
−0.141 ∗∗ −0.087 ∗ 0.012 −0.140 ∗∗ −0.086 ∗ 0.015 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
Founder CEO 2.232 ∗∗∗ 2.286 ∗∗∗ 2.239 ∗∗∗ 2.232 ∗∗∗ 2.286 ∗∗∗ 2.239 ∗∗∗
(39.334) (31.234) (22.735) (39.336) (31.250) (22.730) 
Crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 291 268 236 290 266 236 
Banks 56 56 50 56 55 50 
Kleibergen-Paap 1546 975.4 515.5 1546 975.9 515.5 
R -squared 0.789 0.773 0.652 0.789 0.773 0.651 
Notes: 2SLS regressions for dividend payers. Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in 
parentheses. Performance variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Significance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Significance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Significance at 1% level. 
tains information on the outcomes of parliamentary elections in terms of total votes and percent- 
age of votes for each of the main parties in the elections. For presidential elections understanding 
whether there is a change in power is straightforward. 26 However, the parliamentary elections in- 
formation needs to be supplemented with other data sources because governments can be formed by 
various coalitions between two or more parties. As such, we combine the aforementioned information 
with other sources (such as Bloomberg, European Journal of Political Research-Political Data Yearbook, 
the Guardian, and Reuters) to determine whether the elections determined a change in government. 
We then run probit regressions where the dependent variable is the first-difference of the dummy 
Government Official on the Board and the independent variable is either Elections (a dummy variable 
equal to one if in the previous year there is either a parliamentary or a presidential election and zero 
otherwise) or Change in Government (a dummy variable equal to one if in the previous year there is a 
change in the parties in government and zero otherwise). The results, untabulated but available upon 
request, suggest that Change in Government does not have any effect on the probability of a change 
in Government Official on the Board . However, this may be due to the low number of cases for which 
there was a change in government. When we consider the results for the probit regressions with Elec- 
tions , we find that they increase the probability that there will be government official on the board 
of a bank in the next year. 27 However, when we include Elections in the regressions on dividend pay- 
26 For instance, consider the 2012 presidential elections in France, as a result of which Nicolas Sarkozy (center-right) was 
replaced by François Hollande. On the other hand, in the 2010 elections in the UK, the Labour party (incumbent) received the 
largest number of votes, but the coalition between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats resulted in a change in government. 
27 We also find evidence of a negative impact of Elections on bank profitability (as measured by Market-to-Book and Tobin Q ), 
consistent with Iannotta et al. (2013) . 
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Table 9 
Determinants of current and future performance: Unforced CEO Turnover and CEO Tenure . 
Performance proxy Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q 
Period t t + 1 t + 2 t t + 1 t + 2 
Unforced CEO Turnover 1.107 ∗ 0.528 ∗ −0.065 1.075 ∗ 0.520 ∗ −0.077 
(1.801) (1.718) ( −0.116) (1.815) (1.708) ( −0.138) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
Founder CEO −0.284 ∗∗∗ −0.377 ∗∗∗ −0.425 ∗∗∗ −0.290 ∗∗∗ −0.377 ∗∗∗ −0.425 ∗∗∗
( −3.885) ( −5.834) ( −6.878) ( −3.956) ( −5.832) ( −6.876) 
Controls and crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 291 268 236 290 266 236 
Banks 56 56 50 56 55 50 
Kleibergen-Paap 15.08 34.03 47.18 15.64 33.99 47.18 
R -squared 0.440 0.701 0.657 0.460 0.700 0.657 
CEO Tenure −0.194 ∗ −0.103 ∗ 0.015 −0.191 ∗∗ −0.102 ∗ 0.017 
( −1.953) ( −1.816) (0.122) ( −1.965) ( −1.808) (0.144) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
Founder CEO 1.609 ∗∗∗ 1.921 ∗∗∗ 1.933 ∗∗∗ 1.629 ∗∗∗ 1.921 ∗∗∗ 1.933 ∗∗∗
(7.875) (11.420) (12.842) (8.031) (11.411) (12.839) 
Controls and crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 290 267 235 289 265 235 
Banks 56 56 50 56 55 50 
Kleibergen-Paap 62.00 130.5 164.5 64.47 130.2 164.5 
R -squared 0.747 0.761 0.658 0.751 0.761 0.658 
Notes: 2SLS regressions for dividend payers. The controls include RetVol , Board size , Treasury securities , Size , and Year > 2010 . 
Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in parentheses. Performance variables are win- 
sorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Significance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Significance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Significance at 1% level. 
outs, Elections does not have any impact on DPE (Ln), and the results for the other coefficients remain 
substantially unaltered. 
4.3. Robustness tests 
In this section we present robustness tests to allow for other determinants of dividend policy that 
may have not been considered in the regressions reported in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 . 
We start from the possibility of tax clienteles ( Elton and Gruber, 1970 ). In Table 12 we report 
robustness tests using 2SLS models considering the effect of the tax differential ( Tax Differential ) be- 
tween capital gains and dividends. 28 To further increase the robustness of our findings, we also con- 
sider the effect of using the natural logarithm of CEO Ownership . The coefficients on Tax Differen- 
tial tend to be negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero. This finding is consistent with 
DeAngelo et al. (2008) who found that taxes may not be first-order determinant of the choice be- 
tween dividends and stock repurchases. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients on the 
other variables are substantially the same as those reported in Tables 4 and 5 . In Table 13 , follow- 
ing Hirtle (2014) , we investigate the impact of considering total payouts on our analysis. We replace 
DPE (cash dividends to bank equity) with the sum of cash dividends and the cash distributed through 
28 The data on the tax rates for dividends and capital gains is taken from Carroll et al. (2012) . 
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Table 10 
Impact of government monitoring on dividend payout ratio. 
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 
DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) DPE (Ln) 
Government Ownership (Ln) −0.175 ∗∗ −0.171 ∗ −0.213 ∗∗∗ −0.134 ∗∗∗
( −1.975) ( −1.909) ( −3.127) ( −2.819) 
Government monitoring −1.311 ∗∗ −1.278 ∗∗ −1.638 ∗∗∗ −1.664 ∗∗∗
( −2.046) ( −1.970) ( −2.932) ( −4.076) 
Market-to-Book 0.424 ∗∗∗ 0.392 ∗∗∗ 2.501 ∗∗∗ 2.214 ∗∗
(4.071) (3.469) (2.874) (2.569) 
Tobin Q 0.446 ∗∗∗ 0.415 ∗∗∗ 0.342 ∗∗∗ −0.057 
(4.179) (3.627) (2.875) ( −0.454) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crisis (20 08–20 09) included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 1st stage 
HHI (Ln) 1.253 ∗∗∗ 1.252 ∗∗∗ 0.167 ∗∗∗ 0.167 ∗∗∗ 1.367 ∗∗∗ 1.367 ∗∗∗ 0.164 ∗∗∗ 0.104 ∗∗∗
(3.198) (3.191) (3.262) (3.256) (6.733) (6.875) (5.742) (3.709) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 450 446 450 446 303 302 303 302 
Banks 77 76 77 76 65 65 65 65 
Kleibergen-Paap weak IV test 10.23 10.18 10.64 10.60 – – – –
R -squared 0.350 0.357 0.245 0.256 0.341 0.709 0.352 0.623 
Notes: The controls include Retained earnings ratio , Size , and Year > 2010 . Government monitoring is a dummy equal to one if 
government ownership is above 3% or there is a government official on the board of the bank. HHI stands for Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index. Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in parentheses (for 2SLS 
models). For the sake of space, we do not report the results for the regressions on the performance variables, Market-to-Book 
and Tobin Q , and the government monitoring variables, Government Ownership and Government monitoring . However, we report 
the coefficients (and related standard errors) for the HHI in the regressions on the government monitoring variables. As for 
Table 5–9 , for the 3SLS models the regressions on the performance variables include RetVol and Treasury securities. DPE (Ln), 
performance, and control variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Significance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Significance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Significance at 1% level. 
stock repurchases divided by total equity ( TP ). 29 The coefficients on the CEO power proxies remain 
significant and with the expected sign. 30 
We further examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in the dependent variable by substi- 
tuting DPE (Ln) with the ratio of dividends to total assets. The results for the CEO power proxies and 
for director ownership remain substantially unaltered, as shown in Table 14 . 
Finally, we carry out further robustness tests on the effect of capital requirements, loans growth, 
and the proxy for profitability. 31 
First, to examine the impact of capital requirements ( Onali, 2014 ), we include in the 2SLS regres- 
sions with the CEO power proxies (including the log of CEO Ownership ) the dummy variable Close , 
which takes the value one if the Tier 1 ratio is less or equal to six percent and zero otherwise. The 
coefficients on Close are negative and either weakly significant or insignificant, and the magnitude and 
sign of the coefficients on the CEO power proxies remain virtually unaltered. 
Second, we run again the 2SLS regressions with the CEO power proxies (including the log of CEO 
Ownership ) after replacing Market-to-book and Tobin Q with the variables ROA (Return on Assets) and 
Loans Growth (the percentage change in loans from t − 1 to t ). ROA is a proxy for performance and 
29 We download data on share repurchases from SNL Financial. 
30 We also run again the 2SLS regressions with Government Ownership and Government monitoring , adding the tax differential 
as an explanatory variable, and considering the total payout ratios instead of cash dividends only. The results remain substan- 
tially the same as those reported in Tables 10 and 11 . 
31 These results are untabulated for the sake of space but available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 11 
Determinants of current and future performance: Government Ownership and Government monitoring . 
Performance proxy Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Market-to-Book Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q 
Period t t + 1 t + 2 t t + 1 t + 2 
Government Own. (Ln) 0.009 0.063 0.132 0.009 0.062 0.131 
(0.165) (1.059) (1.183) (0.180) (1.059) (1.185) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
HHI (Ln) 1.382 ∗∗∗ 1.250 ∗∗∗ 0.942 ∗∗ 1.382 ∗∗∗ 1.250 ∗∗∗ 0.942 ∗∗
(3.122) (3.196) (2.156) (3.123) (3.196) (2.155) 
Controls and crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 294 271 239 293 269 239 
Banks 56 56 50 56 55 50 
R -squared 0.782 0.739 0.548 0.783 0.739 0.546 
Kleibergen-Paap 9.743 10.22 4.635 9.752 10.21 4.635 
Government monitoring 0.074 0.511 0.976 0.078 0.504 0.968 
(0.165) (1.090) (1.222) (0.180) (1.089) (1.224) 
1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 
HHI (Ln) 0.165 ∗∗∗ 0.153 ∗∗∗ 0.127 ∗∗ 0.165 ∗∗∗ 0.153 ∗∗∗ 0.127 ∗∗
(2.794) (2.755) (2.063) (2.794) (2.755) (2.062) 
Controls and crisis included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 294 271 239 293 269 239 
Banks 56 56 50 56 55 50 
R -squared 0.781 0.736 0.551 0.781 0.736 0.549 
Kleibergen-Paap 7.802 7.591 4.245 7.806 7.586 4.245 
Notes: 2SLS regressions for dividend payers. The controls include RetVol , Board size , Retained earnings ratio , Size , and Year > 2010 . 
Standard Errors clustered on the bank level, heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics in parentheses. Performance variables are win- 
sorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
∗ Significance at 10% level. 
∗∗ Significance at 5% level. 
∗∗∗ Significance at 1% level. 
Loans Growth is a proxy for growth opportunities. The coefficients on the CEO power proxies remain 
negative and significant. The coefficient on ROA is insignificant, while the coefficient on Loans Growth 
is negative and significant. A negative coefficient on growth opportunities is consistent with the find- 
ings reported in the non-financial literature ( Fama and French, 2001 ). When we repeat estimations 
using the proxy CEO Duality (a dummy variable that takes that value one if the CEO is also the chair- 
man of the board and zero otherwise), instrumented by number of independent directors 32 divided 
by the total number of board members, the results remain qualitatively the same. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the effects of CEO power on dividend policy in banks from EU-15 
countries. We use a unique hand-collected data set with information on board composition and own- 
ership structure for European listed banks over the period 2005–2013. We exploit detailed bank-level 
data on government ownership and officials represented on bank boards to investigate the impact of 
government monitoring on bank dividend policy. This sample is merged with data from Bankscope 
and bank annual reports that provides information on dividends and other financial characteristics. 
According to the (non-bank) managerial entrenchment literature, dividend payout ratios are pos- 
itively related to CEO power since dividends discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. The 
32 For an explanation of how we define independent directors, see Appendix A.4 . 
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non-bank evidence from Europe also suggests that dividends dampen expropriation of minority share- 
holders consistent with a positive relation between dividend payout ratios and expropriation incen- 
tives. However, we find that monitoring from the government leads to an inverse relation between 
CEO power and dividend payouts. Entrenched bank CEOs pay lower dividends and in doing so are less 
likely to attract undesired attention from government regulators. 
Our main findings document a negative relation between CEO ownership and CEO tenure and pay- 
out ratios, and a positive link between unforced CEO turnover events and dividend payout ratios. 
CEO ownership and CEO tenure are also negatively related to bank performance, while unforced CEO 
turnover events are associated with increases in bank performance. These findings suggest that en- 
trenched CEOs in European banks do not have the incentive to increase payout ratios to discourage 
monitoring from shareholders. We also provide evidence that director ownership improves perfor- 
mance (as suggested by the non-financial literature) and reduces dividend payout ratios. According 
to the non-financial literature, the more effective internal governance mechanisms are, the larger the 
payouts required for entrenched managers to discourage monitoring. Our findings, on the other hand, 
suggest that in European banks the members of the board of directors tend to prefer low dividend 
payout ratios to support the capital position of the bank. 
We also document that government monitoring does not have a significant effect on bank perfor- 
mance but impinges on payout ratios. In line with the view that the government puts the interests 
of depositors before that of bank shareholders, we provide evidence of a negative relation between 
government ownership and payout ratios. When there is a government official on the board banks 
make lower dividend payouts. In conclusion, these results are consistent with the view that in bank- 
ing, entrenched CEOs do not have a strong incentive to pay large dividends, because of a combination 
of weak minority shareholders regulation, an inefficient market for corporate control, and concerns of 
the government over bank soundness. These factors lead to the negative relation between CEO power 
and dividend payouts. 
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Appendix A 
Definition of Unforced CEO Turnover, Government Officials, Board Members and Independent Directors. 
In this section we briefly describe the criteria employed to determine whether there is a govern- 
ment official on the board of directors (BoD) and whether a member of the BoD is ‘independent’. 
A.1. Unforced CEO turnover 
To collect data on CEO turnover, we use LEXIS/NEXIS, and employ a key-word search procedure 
based on Schaeck et al. (2012) to distinguish between forced and unforced CEO turnovers during 
2005–2010. After collecting data on the year of the CEO turnover and the CEO name, we look for CEO 
turnover based on the following keywords: ‘management change’, ‘forced resignation’, ‘turnover’, ‘sep- 
aration’, ‘ousted’, ‘early retirement’, ‘step down’, ‘mandatory separation’, ‘voluntary separation’, ‘fired’, 
‘made redundant’, ‘departure’, ‘management succession’, ‘executive change’ and ‘tenure’. These data 
are matched with the bank name. 
Following Schaeck et al. (2012) , we classify a turnover as ‘forced’ if the CEO is reported to have 
been dismissed, forced to resign or to have left the bank due to undisclosed policy differences. We 
define all remaining CEO turnovers as unforced, unless they meet at least one of the following criteria 
( Schaeck et al., 2012 ): 
(a) the reason for the CEO turnover is declared not to be: death, poor health, or acceptance of a 
position either elsewhere or within the bank; 
(b) it is reported that the reason for the CEO turnover is retirement, but retirement is not an- 
nounced until at least six months prior to succession. 
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Moreover, if a reason for CEO turnover is not provided, we assume that the turnover is forced due 
to disciplining actions or due to company policy disputes. 
Following the criteria listed above, we classify 86 CEO turnovers, of which 22 are forced (which 
occurred mainly in the period 2008–2010). We classify the remaining 64 CEO turnovers as unforced. 
A.2. Government officials 
We qualify a board member as a government representative if any individual is described in the 
annual report of the bank by one of the following combination of words: ‘Government commissioner’, 
‘Government representative’, ‘Representatives of the regulatory authority’, and ‘Deputy government 
commissioner’. In certain cases, the government official is identified by a combination of words that 
includes the name of the country. For instance, for Lloyds Banking Group Plc, the government official 
is identified by the words ‘Board Representative for Scotland’, while for the Greek bank Alpha Bank 
AE, the government official is identified by the words ‘representative of the Hellenic Republic’. For 15 
banks in our sample the variable Government Official on the Board is equal to one in at least one year 
during the sample period for a total of 60 bank-year observations (as reported in Table 3 , for which 
7.7% of the total available observations for Government Official on the Board (775) take on the value 
one). Out of this 60 observations, 52 refer to the period 2008–2013, suggesting that in most cases 
government officials were appointed as a result of the financial crisis and the recent sovereign debt 
crisis in the EU. The countries for which the dummy variable is equal to one in at least one year are: 
Austria, Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK. 
A.3. Board members 
EU banks can have a one-tier or two-tier corporate governance structure (or board structure). As 
the name suggests, a two-tier governance structure is one with two boards of directors. The manage- 
ment and monitoring function are performed by the two boards in a separate fashion in the two-tier 
case, and by different members of the board in the one-tier case ( Arnaboldi and Casu, 2011 ). 
The definitions of one-tier and two-tier structure vary according to country. For banks in our sam- 
ple, the management function is performed by a board usually named the ‘management board’ or 
‘executive board’, while the monitoring function is performed by a board usually named the ‘Board of 
Directors’, or ‘non-executive supervisory board’. 
For banks with a two-tier board structure, we use the following keywords to identify members of 
the ‘management board’: ‘Management board’, ‘Executive board’, ‘Executive management’, ‘Executive 
team’, ‘Executive committee’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘CEO & CFO’, ‘Managing director’, and ‘General man- 
ager’. For banks with a one-tier board structure we use the following keywords to identify members 
of the ‘management board’: ‘Executive committee’, ‘Management committee’, ‘Delegated committee’, 
‘Executive board’, Management board’, ‘General management’, ‘General manager’, ‘Management’, ‘Gen- 
eral directors’, ‘Group executive management’, and ‘Group executive committee’. 
For banks with a two-tier board structure, we use the following keywords to identify members 
of the ‘supervisory board’: ‘Supervisory board’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Advisory board’. As explained in 
Section A4, we consider all members of the ‘supervisory board’ as ‘independent directors’ for banks 
with a two-tier board structure. 
For banks with a one-tier board structure, we use the criteria set out in Section A4 to identify 
‘independent directors’, i.e. directors with a monitoring role. 
A.4. Independent directors 
We define ‘independent directors’ as reported in a bank’s annual report. A member of the Board 
of Directors (BoD) is deemed to be independent if such persons do not have any business or personal 
relations with the company or its management board. In many cases, banks self-report the degree of 
board independence of their own BoD. This is usually defined as the number of independent directors 
divided by number of BoD members excluding employee representatives and government representa- 
tives. We use the same approach for board independence calculation for comparability of the results 
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across different banks. For example, in Nordea Bank’s annual report, independent directors are de- 
fined as ‘[…] the number of Board members who are independent in relation to the Company and 
its executive management as well as independent in relation to the Company’s major shareholders.’ 
For banks with a two-tier corporate governance structure, we consider as independent directors the 
members of the supervisory board. For banks with a one-tier board structure, we define independent 
directors according to the criteria listed above. 
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